Homeless Encampments: A Philosophical Justification
Encampments are increasingly prevalent in US and Canadian cities.
In a recently published article, I discuss the philosophical justifications for homeless encampments. The paper explores the connection between property law, homelessness, and the notion of justification in criminal law theory. In criminal law, a “justification” is a category of defense that transforms the moral quality of conduct from presumptively wrongful to morally acceptable in the circumstances. For example, use of physical force against others is presumptively wrong because it violates individual autonomy. But police officers can justifiably use necessary and reasonable force against others to enforce the law, prevent crime, and fulfil other legal obligations.
The article, which is entitled “Homeless Encampments: A Philosophical Justification”, argues that encampments cannot constitute a complete (or unconditional) justification. It contends that individuals who lack access to housing cannot justifiably establish permanent encampments by either appropriating public property or others’ private property due to extreme need.
However, encampments are a partially justifiable (and conditional) response to homelessness in contexts where individuals lack access to housing and other reasonable alternatives. The partial justifiability of encampments — and the fact that individuals cannot justifiably create their own private property rights through self-help mechanisms— underpins a right to housing that safeguards security and freedom.
Note: all views expressed in this blog post and in this article are my own. My views are not endorsed by — and do not represent — the views of any academic institution.
